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Abstract
Peer-to-peer networks have many advantageous security properties, including
decentralization, natural load-balancing, and data replication. However, one
disadvantage of decentralization is its exclusion of any central authority who can
detect and evict malicious peers from the network. It is therefore relatively easy to
sustain distributed denial-of-service attacks against these networks; malicious peers
simply join the network and fail to forward messages.
This article shows that peer-to-peer message-dropping attacks can be understood in
terms of a well-established category of economic theory: the theory of the second
best. In particular, peers who wish to continue service during an attack seek a second
best solution to a utility optimization problem. This insight reveals useful connections
between economic literature on the second best and computer science literature on
peer-to-peer security. To illustrate, we derive and test an economics-inspired
modification to the Chord peer-to-peer routing protocol that improves network
reliability during message-dropping attacks. Under simulation, networks using the
modified protocol achieve a 50% increase in message deliveries for certain realistic
attack scenarios.
1 Introduction
Peer-to-peer networks are an increasingly popular vehicle for highly fault-tolerant,
light-weight, and low-cost distributed computing across heterogeneous hardware.
Cloud computing [1], digital music exchange [2], digital libraries [3], secure data man-
agement systems [4], and bioinformatics databases [5] are just a few of the venues
where this technology is being used today. Unlike traditional networks, peer-to-peer
networks lack any centralized server; every agent acts as both server and client. This
provides a natural resistance to many attacks, since adversaries must compromise a
large number of peers instead of just a few central servers to corrupt data integrity or
disrupt its availability.
Unfortunately, decentralization can leave peer-to-peer networks vulnerable to a dif-
ferent sort of denial-of-service attack wherein malicious agents join the network and
misroute or drop messages, thereby disrupting communication. Constraining this
message-dropping behavior is difficult since victims typically learn only that their mes-
sages weren’t delivered, not who was at fault. Even when malicious behavior is loca-
lized to a particular peer, there is no central authority who can evict the peer from the
network, leaving it free to perpetuate the attack. A small number of malicious agents
can amplify their message-dropping with a Sybil attack [6], in which each joins the
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network many times under various false identities to occupy a greater percentage of
the overlay space. Since dropping messages is computationally inexpensive for the
attacker, a relatively small number of attackers can significantly disrupt overlay traffic.
We gain insight into this problem by connecting it to economic theories of the
second best [7] (cf., [8]). Second best economic solutions are required when one or
more units contravene the first best solution, and there is no way to remove the mis-
behaving units from the system. The second best solution incorporates (takes as given)
the misbehavior of the deviate units to obtain a second best optimum. In the case of
peer-to-peer networks, we find that application of second best theory to the secure
routing problem yields recommendations that advise non-malicious peers on how to
route messages optimally given observed misbehavior of their neighbors. By taking the
network topology as given, such recommendations can be implemented atop any given
topology to achieve better performance during a message-dropping attack.
Adopting the piecemeal approach of Davis and Whinston [9] further allows each
peer to optimize its own behavior with only local knowledge, and without requiring
cooperation from other peers. Thus, the recommendations can be implemented fully
automatically by individual peer clients without a central authority that has global
knowledge, and without requiring other agents to adopt the new protocol.
We show how these theoretical insights can be used in practice by deriving a simple
modification to the Chord peer-to-peer networking protocol [10] that improves overlay
performance during message-dropping attacks. When faced with message-dropping
agents, peers approximate a second best alternative to optimal overlay routes. Simula-
tion of our modified protocol shows that message delivery rates improve by over 50%
with a corresponding increase in overall system utility under realistic attack scenarios.
The modified protocol is simple to implement since it does not require any change to
the network topology and uses only information that is already available in a standard
Chord network.
We begin by summarizing related work in §2. Section 3 reviews the economic theory
of the second best and argues its relevance to peer-to-peer systems. The individual and
social welfare perspectives are each elaborated in §4, yielding a general framework for
expressing peer-to-peer message-dropping attacks as second best utility optimization
problems. The framework is general enough to include many different definitions of
utility, including those that incorporate both reliability and risk. Section 5 applies this
framework to Chord, showing its effectiveness in resisting both non-coordinated and
coordinated, distributed, message-dropping attacks. Finally, §6 concludes with a sum-
mary and suggestions for future work.
2 Related Work
Over the past decade there has been an explosion of research devoted to peer-to-peer
security (cf., [11]). Relevant issues include robust search [12], pollution prevention (i.e.,
inhibiting the spread of unwanted objects), secure data storage, and data confidential-
ity. Most work on these assumes a secure routing framework that facilitates reliable,
robust communication between peers. For example, reputation-based trust managers
such as EigenTrust [13], Credence [14], and Penny [15], aggregate local reputation
information whose exchange requires a secure routing framework.
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Secure routing is divisible into three sub-problems [16]: secure identifier assignment,
routing table maintenance, and message forwarding. Secure identifiers prevent attack-
ers from misrepresenting or abusing their overlay positions to intercept more than
their share of traffic. Secure routing tables maintain peers’ connections to appropriate
sets of neighbor peers. Finally, secure message forwarding delivers messages using the
secure identifiers and routing tables. This last sub-problem is the focus of our work.
Secure message forwarding has been studied from an economic perspective in the
context of selfish routing [17]. Selfish routers enjoy the message-forwarding services
provided by fellow peers, but fail to forward the messages of others. Unlike message-
droppers, selfish routers desire services from the network. This has led to incentive-
based solutions such as pricing networks [18], negotiating contracts for mutual mes-
sage delivery [19], rewarding message delivery with increased reputation [20], and
rewarding message delivery with increased quality of service [21]. In contrast, message-
droppers only desire to disrupt service, making incentivization inapplicable.
Economists have also studied peer-to-peer networks in the context of free-riding.
Free-riding peers obtain shared resources from the network but fail to share their own
resources. Krishnan et al. [22] observe that the shared resources resemble public goods
[23]–an insight that has generated a growing body of work devoted to incentivizing
free-riding peers to share [24]. However, unlike public goods, the connectivity that is
threatened during a message-dropping attack is not equally available to all peers; it is
influenced by the position of the attackers relative to each peer. This leads us to a dif-
ferent economic model for message-dropping.
Message forwarding in peer-to-peer networks can be divided into protocols for struc-
tured and unstructured networks. Structured networks route queries using a multi-hop
protocol that passes the message from peer to peer. Examples include CAN [25], Pas-
try [26], Chord [10], and Tapestry [27]. Unstructured peer-to-peer networks like Gnu-
tella broadcast queries using a multicast protocol that floods the query to all peers
within a given radius. The unstructured approach tends to be more robust against
message-dropping because of its high redundancy, but it does not always scale well
[28]. Although our work is potentially applicable to unstructured topologies, we focus
on structured ones since message-dropping tends to be a more significant threat in
those contexts.
A large body of prior work improves the robustness of structured networks by aug-
menting their topologies with redundant routing paths (e.g., [29-31]). Route redun-
dancy increases the probability that at least one message replica reaches its destination.
Such topologies can be improved further via adaptive techniques that adjust the topol-
ogy dynamically in response to observed failures (e.g., [32,33]) or based on the interac-
tion history of peers (e.g., [34,35]). In contrast to these approaches, our work adapts
routing flow rates without modifying the topology. Our work therefore complements
the above by optimizing routing behavior once a (possibly dynamic) topology is
chosen.
Adaptive techniques, including ours, require a means of detecting message-dropping
behavior. Section 5 adopts a sampling approach in which non-malicious peers test for
malicious behavior by periodically sending probe messages. Such sampling has been
effectively used in unstructured networks to detect and identify message-droppers [36].
Introduction graphs [37] and flow rate histories [38] can further help to identify and
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isolate malicious peers, but sampling has the advantage of being easy to implement
atop networks that do not collect this extra information.
3 Peer-to-peer and the Second Best
3.1 Overview of the Second Best
The theory of the second best has had a significant impact on economics throughout
the past half-century, being applied to such subjects as health care, antitrust, and inter-
national trade [8]. In the case of peer-to-peer overlays, the original design of the over-
lay topology can be thought of as a first best solution that optimizes message delivery
when all peers are non-malicious. Adapting individual peer routing behavior to the
presence of malicious peers can therefore be viewed as a second best solution to this
optimization problem.
Economic theory generally begins with economic subunits such as consumers, house-
holds, or firms that attempt to optimize their own objective functions subject to var-
ious constraints. These economic subunits work within a larger administrative
perspective that is defined by the set of rules governing the system and the degree of
decentralization. This leads to a larger fundamental problem first formulated by Nobel
laureate Paul Samuelson [39], who observed that every society acts as if it is attempting
to maximize a (known or unknown) social welfare function subject to constraints.a The
welfare function is so named because it incorporates the goals of all economic subu-
nits. For any viable system, the optimal conditions derived from the fundamental pro-
blem must also be consistent with the optimal behavior of the economic subunits.
Following Samuelson and the later literature [7], we write this problem in its most
general form as:
maximize F(x1, . . . , xn) subject to G(x1, . . . , xn) = 0 (1)
The objective function is F, the binding constraint is G, and the choice variables are
xi with i Î 1..n. In a decentralized, consumer-oriented economy these choice variables
are selected by independent economic subunits (e.g., consumers). The objective func-
tion is related to the maximization of the consumers’ objective functions (utility func-
tions) subject to constraints reflecting consumer income limitations. In a peer-to-peer
network the choice variables are selected by individual peers and the constraints are
those imposed by the routing protocol and the overlay topology.
The first best solution to the problem formalized by Equation 1 has the following
necessary conditions for an optimal solution [7]:
Fi + λGi = 0 ∀i ∈ 1..n (2)
where Fi and Gi are partial first derivatives and l is a Lagrange multiplier
b associated
with the constraint in Equation 1. To obtain the first best solution, individual subunits
solve their respective constrained optimization problems, and these must be consistent
with the necessary conditions given by Equation 2.
Samuelson was the first to recognize that when some economic subunits fail to
adhere to Equation 2, the ramifications extend beyond that deviate sector:
“First, what is the best procedure if for some reason a number of optimum condi-
tions are not realized? What shall we do about the remaining ones which are in our
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power? Shall we argue that ‘two wrongs do not make a right’ and attempt to satisfy
those we can? Or is it possible that failure of a number of conditions necessitates
modifying the rest? Clearly the latter alternative is the correct one.” [[39], p. 252]
In other words, if the first best solution is unobtainable because one sector behaves
suboptimally, then the second best solution does not necessarily imply that the remain-
ing sectors should continue to satisfy their first best optimization conditions; many
subunits may need to change their optimal behaviors.
Lipsey and Lancaster [7] formalized the second best solution with an additional con-
straint containing the first-order behavior of the deviating sector. We use the concise
presentation of Henderson and Quandt [[40], p. 316], who append the following con-
straints to the problem given by Equation 1:
Fj = hjGj, hj = λ, hj = 0 (3)
The second best optimal condition that replaces Equation 2 isc
Fi + λGi + μ(Fji − hjGji) = 0 ∀i ∈ 1..n (4)
where Fji and Gji are the partial cross-derivatives between subunits i and j and μ is
the new Lagrange variable associated with constraint 3. Thus, unless the cross-deriva-
tives are zero, each sector i Î 1..n has optimal behavior that deviates from Equation 2.
Negishi [41] (cf., [42]) further found that under standard economic assumptions of a
competitive, decentralized economy (viz., concave functions and at least one interior
solution) it is as if society seeks to maximize a specific social welfare function expressi-
ble as a weighted sum of the consumer utility functions Ui(xi). The final form of the
society’s objective function is therefore




The coefficients ai are the final weights given by the implicit social welfare to the
utility of the economic subunits.d
These weights have a specific economic interpretation: Each consumer or house-
hold’s weight is the reciprocal of its marginal utility of income. Thus, if a wealthy
family places relatively low value on the last dollar earned, it receives a relatively high
weight in the objective function of the society. In essence, the system tends to weight
the more successful households (in terms of income).
We find a similar result in the case of peer-to-peer systems. During a message-drop-
ping attack, non-malicious peers can be defined as those that derive utility from mes-
sage deliveries. This leads to a social welfare (administrative objective) function that
weights peers by the reciprocal of their relative reliability–i.e., their message delivery
success rates. When all weights are equal (a standard assumption when applying utility
theory to information systems problems [43]), this corresponds to the special case
where all peers in the network are equally reliable.
Davis and Whinston [9] used Negishi’s result to provide a piecemeal approach to the
second best problem. They concluded that the difficulties of implementing a complex
set of second best conditions is often overestimated since, based on Equation 5, many
of the second derivatives are zero in a decentralized system and can therefore be
Hamlen and Hamlen Security Informatics 2012, 1:6
http://www.security-informatics.com/content/1/1/6
Page 5 of 22
dropped. In the context of a peer-to-peer network, this implies that it is possible to
approach the second best solution without the need to share global information
amongst peers. Instead, each peer adapts its own behavior individually, based on its
own knowledge.
Based on the economic development above, there are two separate aspects of the
problem: the mathematical method proposed by Lipsey and Lancaster, and the welfare
and utility considerations discussed by Samuelson and Negishi. Section 3.2 examines
the former aspect and §4.2 the latter.
3.2 Example Application of the Second Best to a Peer-to-peer System
Application of the second best approach to resisting message-dropping attacks in peer-
to-peer overlays can be illustrated by a simple example. We begin by considering a sin-
gle peer p of degree k in a network of size n (with k ≪ n). Peer p periodically receives
messages for other peers, each of which it must forward to one of its k neighbors. We
assume a flat identifier space for this example, and that peer p may forward each mes-
sage to any one of its k neighbors (though for any given message, certain neighbors are
better positioned than others to deliver it).
The first best solution to this problem is the one addressed when designing the over-
lay topology, which assigns p an optimal set of k neighbors given an assumed distribu-
tion of message destinations seen by p. Specifically, we seek the k neighbors that
minimize the absolute distance between each message’s final destination and the near-







|x − Ni|Dp(x)dx (6)
where Ni ∀i Î 1..k are the desired neighbor identifiers in ascending order, N0 = 0
and Nk+1 = n are the limits of the identifier space, and Dp is the probability density of
message destinations seen by p. For example, if Dp is a uniform distribution, the opti-
mal first order conditions (derived by setting the derivative of Equation 6 with respect
to Ni to zero) are:
Ni = 12(Ni−1 +Ni+1) ∀i ∈ 1..k (7)
That is, a uniformly distributed set of random messages is delivered most effectively
when the k neighbors of p have identifiers that are evenly spaced along the interval [0,
n).
The above implicitly assumes that peers behave optimally, forwarding each message
to the neighbor closest to its destination. A second best solution is needed when some
peers behave suboptimally and there is no way (short of centralizing the system) to
force optimal behavior. One option in this case is to implement a new first best solu-
tion, but this requires global information about the overlay topology, which isn’t typi-
cally available to peers once the network has been deployed and malicious behavior
becomes evident. The second best solution takes the topology as given and re-solves
the optimization problem to obtain a new recommended optimal behavior for peer p
given the suboptimal behavior of its neighbor(s).
For example, suppose that peer p discovers that of the am messages it forwarded to
peer m Î 1..k during some sampling period, only a∗m of them were ultimately delivered
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to their final destinations. In the first best solution given by Equation 7, peer p for-
wards an average of w/k of its messages to each of its neighbors, where w is the total
number of messages; thus, when a∗m < w/k, neighbor m is behaving suboptimally (pos-
sibly due to the suboptimal behavior of its neighbors). The second best solution with
respect to peer m’s actions requires appending the following constraint to Equation 6,
with new Lagrange multiplier b:
β(a∗m − w/k) ≥ 0 (8)
When not all messages that peer p forwards to peer m are ultimately delivered (i.e.,
am <w/k), we obtain a different optimal identifier value for the neighbor on each side
of neighbor m (obtained by summing Equations 6 and 8, setting the derivative to zero,








2(Nm+2 +Nm) − 12β (10)
Even though peer p cannot change the identifiers of its neighbors, it should forward
its messages as if neighbor m - 1 had identifier N∗m−1 and neighbor m + 1 had identi-





Nm. Peer p therefore forwards fewer messages to neighbor m since fewer destinations




m+1. In the limiting case where a
∗
m = 0 (i.e., neigh-
bor m is completely unreliable), peer p only forwards to m those messages whose final
destinations are m itself.
We next generalize this approach to a larger class of topologies and message-drop-
ping attacks, and we examine the second best approach from both the perspective of
individual peers and that of the system as a whole.
4 Attack Resistance As Utility Optimization
Economic formulations of the second best typically have two aspects: an individual
perspective in which individuals in the society seek to maximize their own utility sub-
ject to individual constraints, and an administrative perspective in which the society as
a whole acts as if it is seeking to maximize an objective function subject to administra-
tive constraints. In this section we develop the each of these aspects as they relate to
message-dropping attacks in peer-to-peer overlays. The analysis of the individual per-
spective yields a piecemeal approach [9] to resisting message-dropping attacks, wherein
each peer individually adjusts its optimal behavior to account for the suboptimal beha-
vior of its immediate neighbors. The analysis of the administrative perspective yields a
measure of the network’s success in resisting message-dropping attacks, providing a
means to evaluate defense effectiveness. We initially consider only peer reliability; risk
is added in §4.3.
4.1 The Individual Perspective
The optimization problem presented in §3.2 can be cast in the more general frame-
work of a utility maximization problem. Following the economic literature, we assume
that all decision-makers seek to maximize their own utility when making choices. The
utility Ui(Pi) of a non-malicious peer i Î 1..n is a function of its message-delivering
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reliability Pi Î [0,1]. Following the standard assumptions on utility functions, we






< 0 ∀i ∈ 1..n (11)
The first derivative of utility is the marginal utility and the second assumption above
is the law of diminishing marginal utility.
Since each peer in the overlay forwards messages through its neighbors, its reliability







wij = 1 ∀i ∈ 1..n (12)
where wij Î [0,1] is the relative share of its messages that peer i forwards to neighbor
j, and Rij(wij) is the reliability that peer i estimates for neighbor j. Rij is a function of wij
because the observed reliability of neighbor j typically varies with the share of messages
it receives from i. As j receives a larger share, a greater portion of their destinations are
farther from j, making those messages harder for j to deliver. Thus, ∂Rij/∂wij ≤ 0.
The optimization problem confronting each peer i is that of maximizing utility sub-
















where ji and li are the Lagrange multipliers.
For example, adopting reliability function Rij(wij) = dijw−cij (generalizing the example
in §3.2 in which dij = 1 and c = 1), using the natural logarithmic utility function Ui =
log, and solving the resulting Kuhn-Tucker conditions (see the appendix), we find that
if peer i deems neighbor m to be a fraction ε Î [0,1] less reliable than neighbor j (i.e.,








4.2 The Administrative Perspective
In this section we derive a measure of the social welfare (i.e., overall system utility) of a
peer-to-peer system using the results from the previous sections. This provides a gen-
eral measure of the performance of the system during a message-dropping attack in
terms of peer utilities. In particular, networks that attain higher social welfare can be
characterized as more robust against message-dropping attacks. Section 4.3 illustrates
the generality of this metric by showing how it can incorporate risk as well as reliabil-
ity, and §5 uses this measure to evaluate the performance of our method when imple-
mented in an actual peer-to-peer network.
The peer-to-peer system acts as though it has an administrator who seeks to maxi-
mize some vector (U1(Pˆ1), . . . ,Un(Pˆn)) of the utility functions of all peers in the sys-
tem [41,42], where Pˆi = Pi/
∑n
j=1 Pj denotes the relative reliability of peer i. Such an
Hamlen and Hamlen Security Informatics 2012, 1:6
http://www.security-informatics.com/content/1/1/6
Page 8 of 22
administrator might not actually exist, but the system behaves as if it does. Recall that
this equates to maximizing the weighted sum in Equation 5. The administrator’s opti-








Pˆi = 1 (15)
Thus, the system behaves as if an administrator determines the relative reliabilities of
all members, knowing that the selection must ultimately account for the various utility
functions of the members as well as their respective optimization behaviors.
A peer-to-peer network’s success in resisting a message-dropping attack can there-
fore be measured by computing the objective function in Equation 15. Combining the
optimality result of the individual behavior described by Equation 13 with the adminis-
trative optimal behavior described by Equation 15, we find (see the appendix) that con-
sistency between the individual behavior and the administrator’s optimal solution
requires that αi = (δ/φi)Pˆi, where δ is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the con-
straint in Equation 15 and φi = (∂Ui/∂Pˆi)Pˆi. This implies that weight ai is directly
related (up to common factor δ) to peer i’s relative reliability and inversely related to
its marginal utility. Using Ui = log yields ji = 1 for all i Î 1..n. Since constant factor δ
has no effect on optimization problem 15, this simplifies to αi = Pˆi.
Thus, a peer-to-peer network’s success in resisting a message-dropping attack is




where Pˆi is the fraction of the messages forwarded by peer i that were ultimately
delivered to their destinations. This can be interpreted as a familiar result from infor-
mation theory. It is the negation of the Shannon entropy of the peer-to-peer system,
and the administrative problem therefore reduces to the problem of minimizing the
entropy subject to the constraints. When there are no additional constraints, the opti-
mal solution is obviously one in which all peers are equally reliable–i.e.,
Pˆi = Pˆj ∀i, j ∈ 1..n. In the case where there are additional constraints (e.g., some peers
are malicious and therefore have constrained reliabilities), the optimal solution is non-
trivial, as we see in §5.
4.3 Risk
In coordinated, distributed, message-dropping attacks, malicious peers vary their beha-
vior over time, dropping some but not all messages they receive in an effort to evade
detection. Malicious peers may even coordinate their behavior changes so as to keep
each individual peer’s reliability relatively high while keeping overall availability of net-
work services low. Peer reliability alone is not an adequate measure of malicious beha-
vior during such an attack; one must also consider variance or risk.
Following the work of von Neumann and Morgenstern [45], there has been strong
agreement that individuals tend to maximize expected utility in the presence of risk.
The negative exponential utility function is most commonly used to examine effects of
both mean and variance in such contexts:
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Ui(Pi) = − exp(−aiPi) ∀i ∈ 1..n (17)
where parameter ai > 0 is a measure of the risk aversion of peer i. (Equation 17 satis-
fies the assumptions about utility given by Equation 11, and approximates the natural
logarithmic utility function used in §4 [46].e) When random variable Pi (i Î 1..n) has
an approximately normal distribution with mean E[Pi] and variance Var[Pi], the
expected utility is
E[Ui(Pi)] = − exp(−aiE[Pi] + 12a2i Var[Pi]) (18)
With risk, the administrative perspective differs from §4.2. There, utility Ui is a func-
tion of only one argument Pi and increases monotonically with Pi; but with risk,
expected utility is a function of two arguments E[Pi] and Var[Pi] and is concave.
Assuming there is at least one interior, feasible solution, we can again write the admin-
istrative objective function as a weighted sum of the expected utilities of the peers.








E[Pˆi] = 1 and
n∑
i,j=1
Cov[Pˆi, Pˆj] = 0 (20)
where Pˆi is the relative reliability of peer i as defined in §4.2 and Cov[X, Y] denotes
the covariance of random variables X and Y.
The first best solution is obviously one in which all peers are invariably equally reli-
able. Since zero variation implies E[Pˆi] = Pˆi, this reduces to the same optimization pro-
blem as derived in §4.2; we therefore conclude that αi = Pˆi as before. When the
variance is non-zero for some peers, we seek a second best solution. In that case the
form of the social welfare function stays the same but is evaluated at the second best
solution. Thus, αi = Pˆi in that case as well, and we conclude that social welfare can be
measured by weighting each peer’s expected utility by its relative reliability. The opti-
mal conditions for Equations 19-20 are derived in the appendix.
We next consider how individual peers make optimal decisions in the presence of
risk in a way that is consistent with the administrative perspective above. Using Equa-














where wij Î [0,1] is again the relative share of messages that peer i forwards to
neighbor j. Substituting these into the Kuhn-Tucker conditions for Equations 19-20
(see the appendix) yields the following system of linear equations that must be solved
to find peer i’s optimal relative use wij of each of its neighbors j Î 1..k:
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1
ai
(E[Pb] − E[Pj]) =
k∑
h=1
wih(Cov[Ph,Pb] − Cov[Ph,Pj]) (23)
Since the shares wij are all relative, we choose some arbitrary benchmark neighbor b
Î 1..k in terms of which peer i computes the other optimal shares.
One approach to implementing the above in actual peer-to-peer client software is
with a linear constraint solver. The system of linear equations given by 23 can be
expressed as a matrix computation of the form
(C−D)w = E (24)
where Chj = Cov[Ph, Pj] is the covariance matrix; Dhj = Cov[Ph, Pb] if h ≠ b and Dbj =
0 otherwise; Ej = (E[Pb] - E[Pj])/ai if j ≠ b and Eb = 1 otherwise; and w is the unknown
length-k vector of relative shares for which the system must be solved. The problem
can be further simplified if we assume that under normal conditions most of the covar-
iance terms for any individual peer are likely to vanish. We can therefore approximate
the above solution by setting them to zero, which simplifies to the following formula








Peers that use Equation 25 to guide their relative usage of their neighbors tend to
maximize expected reliability and minimize risk as they forward messages. This can
have some interesting ramifications for peer behavior. For example, depending on their
risk aversion ai, they may sometimes forward messages through less reliable peers to
avoid a more reliable but much riskier one. Risk-averse peers also tend to diversify
their message-forwarding behavior similar to an investor’s diversification of a portfolio.
This can result in a better outcome when resending a dropped message since there is
a higher chance that the message will not take the same route to its destination even
when the overlay topology remains static.
5 Implementation
To put our approach into practice, we implemented it within a Chord network [10].
We begin with a review of Chord’s overlay structure and routing protocol in §5.1. Sec-
tion 5.2 then formulates the Chord protocol as a utility optimization problem using
the second best. Finally, §5.3 describes our experimental methodology and results.
5.1 The Chord Protocol
Chord [10] is a structured peer-to-peer protocol with a ring-shaped overlay. Each
peer’s ring position is defined by an integer identifier. Identifiers are derived via secure
hash functions so that attackers cannot easily choose their positions. Each peer is
directly connected to k = ⌊log2 n⌋ neighbors, where n is the size of the identifier space.
For example, in a Chord network that can accommodate 2160 peers, each peer has 160
neighbors.
The neighbor set of peer i is densest near i and thins farther away. Specifically, the
jth neighbor of peer i is the peer whose identifier is closest to (but no less than) (idi +
2j-1) mod n (∀j Î 1..k). Thus, peer i’s first neighbor is its successor in the ring, each
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subsequent neighbor is approximately twice as far from i as its previous neighbor, and
peer i’s last neighbor is approximately halfway around the ring. To send a message to
peer h, peer i forwards it to the neighbor whose identifier is closest to but no greater
than h’s identifier (modulo n). When all peers adhere to this protocol, messages are
delivered to their final destinations in at most O(log2 n) hops because each hop at
least halves the distance from the message’s current position to its destination. With-
out malicious peers, the topology is naturally load-balancing in that a uniform distribu-
tion of message sources and destinations tends to solicit equal relative use of each
peer’s k neighbors.
During a message-dropping attack, however, malicious peers drop the messages they
receive instead of forwarding them. Since Chord is deterministic, a single malicious
peer on the route from i to h can thereby prevent i from sending any messages to h
until the topology changes (e.g., due to churn). With multiple attackers, the identifier
assignment process tends to distribute attackers approximately uniformly across the
identifier space. As a result, attackers can intercept a significant portion of the overlay
traffic. For example, even when malicious peers comprise only 10% of the network
they can intercept about 40% of the messages on average [47].
5.2 Applying the Second Best Approach to Chord
Peers can forward messages via different neighbors than the ones prescribed by the
Chord protocol at the expense of longer message delivery paths. This flexibility allows
peers to potentially improve message delivery rates in the presence of malicious peers
via a second best routing strategy. Specifically, a peer can potentially forward each
message to any neighbor between itself and the message’s intended destination, not
just the closest one to the destination.
However, this flexibility must be exercised in moderation to avoid unacceptably long
routing paths, since forwarding messages in very small hops greatly increases the
worst-case path length bound given in §5.1. For example, if each peer forwards mes-
sages to its nearest neighbor, the worst-case path length is O(n), which is clearly unrea-
sonable when n ≈ 2160. More generally, when peers forward messages to their rth-
closest neighbors, the worst-case path length increases by a factor of (r - log2(2
r - 1))
-1. Hence, forwarding to the 2nd-closest neighbor multiplies the worst-case path length
by a factor of about 2.4, and forwarding to the 3rd-closest multiplies it by a factor of
over 5.
To keep the worst-case path length reasonable, we therefore modify the Chord pro-
tocol to allow (non-malicious) peers to forward each message only to the closest neigh-
bor or 2nd-closest neighbor to the message’s intended final destination. In our
experiments we found that allowing peers to forward to other neighbors is seldom use-
ful, since during a message-dropping attack greatly increased path lengths almost
always include at least one malicious peer.
Given this restriction, the reliability Pi of any peer i Î 1..n can be expressed in terms
of the reliabilities of its neighbors as follows:
Pi = s1P1 +
k∑
j=2
sj(wijPj + d(1 − wij)Pj−1)
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where sj Î [0,1] is the fraction of the messages seen by peer i whose destinations are
closest to neighbor j, wij Î [0,1] is the share of those sj messages that peer i chooses to
forward to neighbor j (instead of to neighbor j - 1), and d Î [0,1] models a distance
penalty for forwarding messages to the 2nd-closest neighbor instead of to the closest
one. (In our implementation we used d = 0.8, but other values in the interval [0.1, 0.9]
performed similarly.) The expected value and variance of Pi are
E[Pi] = skwikE[Pk] +
k−1∑
j=1






(sj+1d(1 − wij+1) + sjwij)2Var[Pj] (27)
respectively, for all i Î 1..n.
Individual utility is modeled by Equation 17 with the addition of a unit constant to
force non-negative utilities [48]; hence, Ui(Pi) = 1 - exp(-ai Pi). Solving the resulting
optimization problem given by Equation 23 (and zeroing the covariance terms as in
§4.3), yields a system of linear equations of the form A = 0, where A is the n × k
matrix defined by
Aij = −sij(E[Pij] − dE[Pij−1]) + asij
[(









for all j Î 2..k - 1, and for j Î {1, k} we have Ai1 = 0 and
Aik = −sik(E[Pik]−dE[Pik−1])+asik[sikwikVar(Pik)−d(sik−1wik−1+sikd(1−wik))Var[Pik−1]] (29)
Fully solving the above system subject to constraint wij Î [0,1] requires a mixed inte-
ger programming algorithm. However, the implementation can be significantly simpli-
fied by approximating the solution iteratively. We used a quasi-Newtonian
approximation obtained by computing the Hessian matrix of Equations 28-29, zeroing





2 + ais2ij(Var[Pij] + d
2Var[Pij−1])
ψ ∀j ∈ 2..k (30)
wi1 = 1 (31)
where A is defined by Equations 28-29 and ψ controls the rate of convergence. (In
our implementation we used ψ = 1.) Equation 31 reflects the inflexibility of traffic for-
warded to a peer’s first neighbor (since no neighbors fall between a peer and its first
neighbor).
In summary, non-malicious peers in our modified system continuously adjust their
relative usage of neighbors in small increments, based on the most current information
available concerning neighbor reliability and riskiness. These adjustments are made so
as to maximize reliability and minimize risk. That is, each peer optimizes its own
expected utility subject to the constraints imposed by the routing protocol.
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5.3 Experimental Results
To test our solution, we simulated a Chord network in which non-malicious peers
maximize expected utility by adapting their relative use of their neighbors according to
Equation 30. Malicious peers drop some or all messages they are asked to forward. To
assess the network’s success in resisting the attack, we computed the social welfare
(Equation 16) that it attained over each simulation. We also measured the total percen-
tage of messages that were successfully delivered. Each simulation involved sending a
total of one million randomly generated messages through the overlay, and simulation
results were averaged over 50 trials each.
We assume that senders learn whether their messages were ultimately delivered, but
not who dropped undelivered messages. This is consistent with networks in which deliv-
ered messages solicit unforgeable, direct responses from recipients. For example, object
lookups in Chord solicit a direct response that does not use the overlay, and that can be
authenticated via cryptographic message signing. This information allows each peer i to
estimate a running mean E[Pij] and running variance
f Var[Pij] for each neighbor j Î 1..k.
Each peer also tracks its own relative usage sij of each neighbor.
Non-malicious peers begin the simulation with wij = 1 and sij = 1 for all i Î 1..n and j
Î 1..k. That is, each peer initially behaves as in a traditional Chord network, forwarding
each message to the closest neighbor and using all neighbors approximately equally. At
regular intervals, non-malicious peers modify wij according to Equation 30. (If wij rises
above 1 or descends below 0, it is truncated down to 1 or up to 0, respectively.) In our
simulation, peers recomputed wij after every 1000 messages they sent. We used a con-
vergence rate of ψ = 1, a distance penalty of d = 0.8, and a risk aversion of ai = 1 to strike
a roughly even balance between reliability maximization and risk minimization.
Figure 1 shows the overall utilities (i.e., social welfare) attained by a traditional Chord
network, an adaptive Chord network that uses our utility optimization procedure, and

















Figure 1 Social welfare attained during message-dropping attacks.
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an optimal Chord network in which peers have global knowledge of the overlay topol-
ogy and know the identifiers of all malicious peers. For each attack, malicious peers
dropped all messages they received (other than the messages intended for themselves)
and were roughly uniformly distributed throughout the overlay.
The curve for the optimal Chord network was computed by exhaustively deciding for
each possible source-destination pair whether there exists a route through the overlay
that does not include any malicious peers (subject to the constraint that non-malicious
peers must not route messages farther away than their 2nd-closest neighbor to the
message’s intended destination). We simulated networks with up to 10K peers, but the
number of peers did not influence any of our results (except that computing the opti-
mal curve for very large networks was not feasible). The curves shown in Figure 1 are
for a network with 256 peers.
As Figure 1 illustrates, once malicious peers comprise over half the network, our
adaptive approach is unable to provide substantial improvement; however, we see sig-
nificant gains in the more typical scenarios where malicious peers comprise 10%-30%
of the network. Under those conditions the adaptive approach resulted in about a 60%
increase in social welfare compared to a traditional Chord network–about 55% of the
gain that was possible even with global information. Figure 2 verifies that this increase
in social welfare translates to a corresponding increase in message deliveries. Message
delivery success rates were increased by about 52% when malicious peers comprised
10%-30% of the network–about 58% of what was possible with global information.
We next considered a more sophisticated message-dropping attack in which the
attackers vary their behavior over time in an effort to avoid detection. Malicious peers
coordinate these behavior changes to keep each malicious peer’s observed reliability
relatively high while keeping overall network connectivity low. In our simulation,
attackers chose their reliabilities from a normal distribution of mean 0.3 and variance



























Figure 2 Message delivery success rates during message-dropping attacks.
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effective against defense mechanisms that rely on average reliability as the sole indica-
tor of maliciousness. Our protocol’s inclusion of risk as a secondary indicator was
therefore important for resisting this attack.
Figure 3 shows that our adaptive approach continues to provide effective recommen-
dations to non-malicious peers during the attack. The three curves are closer than in
the non-coordinated attack since malicious peers in this simulation deliver at least
some messages. Nevertheless, the adaptive network is still able to achieve a 30%
increase in social welfare (58% of what was possible with global information) when
attackers comprise 10%-30% of the network. Likewise, the message delivery rates
reported in Figure 4 show a 28% increase (60% of what was possible with global infor-
mation). Most importantly, a point-by-point comparison reveals that introducing
attacker behavior variations only increased social welfare and message deliveries com-
pared to when they dropped all messages. Thus, behavior variations were ineffective
when attacking Chord networks equipped with our adaptive routing protocol.
During testing, our utility optimization strategy demonstrated little sensitivity to
parameter changes and implementation details. For example, different convergence
rates ψ, different distance penalties d, different approximation methods for Equations
28-29, and different refresh rates for recomputing shares wij resulted in little or no
change to the results reported here (except when parameters were set to extreme
values). This seems to indicate that our method is does not require much manual tun-
ing to perform well.
6 Conclusion
The theory of the second best has played a significant role over the past several dec-
ades in solving numerous important problems in economics. In this article we have
shown that it also applies to the problem of resisting message-dropping attacks in

















Figure 3 Social welfare attained during coordinated, distributed attacks.
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peer-to-peer overlay networks. If one views the design of the underlying overlay topol-
ogy as an optimization problem, the second best solution yields recommendations on
how to make optimal use of that existing topology in the presence of malicious peers
who drop messages.
This has implications both for individual peers and for the peer-to-peer system as a
whole. For individual peers, the second best solution provides peer-specific recommen-
dations on how to forward messages so as to maximize each peer’s individual reliability
and minimize its risk. For the system as a whole, it maximizes the overall objective of
the system given the misbehavior of the attackers. We found that in this context the
overall objective can be expressed as a weighted sum of the utility functions of the
individual peers, where the weights are the relative reliabilities of the peers. When indi-
vidual utility functions are standard Bernoulli logarithmic functions, this equates to
minimizing the Shannon entropy of the peer-to-peer system.
As a practical application of our work, we solved the above optimization problem for
the Chord peer-to-peer network protocol [10] and implemented it in a simulator.
Non-malicious peers in our modified network forward messages according to the
recommendations prescribed by the second best solution. Rather than compute the
second best solution directly, each peer approximates it iteratively using an efficient
quasi-Newtonian algorithm. We simulated simple message-dropping attacks in which
attackers drop all messages, as well as coordinated, distributed message-dropping
attacks in which attackers vary their behavior to avoid detection. The modified proto-
col achieves a 50% increase in message deliveries and a 60% increase in social welfare
when malicious peers comprise about 20% of the network. Behavior variations are not
effective as a means of disguising the attack; they only result in higher message delivery
rates and higher social welfare in networks equipped with our adaptive protocol.
In future work we intend to apply our approach to other distributed computing



























Figure 4 Message delivery success rates during coordinated, distributed attacks.
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Chord networks, incorporating extra routing links for improved fault tolerance. These
extra links could provide more opportunities for second best optimization. CAN [25]
poses interesting mathematical challenges for our method since it uses a multidimen-
sional identifier space.
In addition, much prior work on adaptive overlay routing has focused on adapting
the overlay topology in response to observed peer behavior and performance. Since
our second best optimization approach takes the topology as given, it could be imple-
mented atop one of these adaptive topologies. Future work should investigate the
interaction between these two approaches.
Finally, we plan to investigate second best optimization approaches to protecting
these networks from other forms of attacks, such as message misrouting, message
integrity and confidentiality violations, and reputation mismanagement. These are all
significant current-day threats to large, distributed data management systems, and
would likely benefit from second best optimization.
Appendix
We here sketch derivations of the solutions of the three main optimization problems
presented throughout the paper. We begin with the problem of individual utility opti-
mization presented in §4.1. The necessary (Kuhn-Tucker) conditions for the problem
given by Equation 13 are
∂Ui
∂Pi































⎠ = 0 (35)
for all i Î 1..n, where ji is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the constraint.
Equation 33 implies that ji > 0 for any positive share wij > 0 with dij > 0, and that








The assumption in §4.1 that peer m is a factor ε less reliable than peer j implies that
dim = εdij. This yields the result given by Equation 14.
We next consider the administrative optimization problem presented in §4.2. The











= 0 ∀i ∈ 1..n (36)
Hamlen and Hamlen Security Informatics 2012, 1:6
http://www.security-informatics.com/content/1/1/6












where δ is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the constraint in Equation 15. By
combining the optimality result of the individual behavior given by Equations 32-35
with the optimal behavior from the administrative perspective given by Equations 36-
37, we see that whenever Pˆi > 0, consistency between the individual behavior and the








Section 4.2 describes how this result leads directly to the conclusion that αi = Pˆi.
Finally, we consider the optimization problem given in §4.3, which introduces risk.
The necessary (Kuhn-Tucker) conditions for the administrative optimization problem
given by Equations 19-20 are









i E[Ui(Pˆi)]Var[Pˆi] − γ
)
Var[Pˆi] = 0 (39)









where δ and g are the Lagrange multipliers. Recall that αi = Pˆi (see §4.3); therefore


















⎠ = 0 (42)
Equation 41 can be reexpressed as wij(E[Ui]zij - ji), where zij is defined by




In the above, ji is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the constraint requiring
that each peer i’s relative usage of its neighbors sums to 1. In most situations the con-
straint would be binding and ji > 0. This complicates the solution for any single wij.
We can, however, examine the ratio E[Ui]zij = ji to E[Ui]zib = ji for any two shares
wij, wib > 0. The benchmark neighbor b is arbitrarily chosen by peer i as the standard
by which its other neighbors are assessed. From the conditions above we see that zij =
zib, leading to the system of linear equations given in Equation 23.
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Notes
aThis “as if” approach is attributed to Nobel laureate Milton Friedman [49], who recog-
nized that participants need not know or understand a model for it to adequately
explain an outcome. Kenneth Arrow [50], another Nobel laureate, later proved that
there are limits on what any welfare function can achieve. bSamuelson [39] and others
used the Lagrange method, which requires binding constraints. Subsequent work used
the Kuhn-Tucker conditions [44], which allow non-binding constraints. cIf l = hj in
Equation 4, the Lagrange multiplier μ is zero, re-attaining the first best solution. Only
when l ≠ hj does the added constraint change the solution.
dHamlen and Hamlen [51]
show that Negishi’s solution, while important in defining the social welfare function,
can be evaluated only at the equilibrium solution and therefore does not aid in obtain-
ing the solution. eThis follows from isoelasticity of natural logarithm [46]. fNeither
running mean nor running variance require maintaining any message history. We com-
puted running variance via Var[Pij] = E[P2ij] − E[Pij]2. gPartial derivatives ∂ are used
here to remind us that the administrator’s objective function contains all Pi ∀i Î 1..n.
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